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the land and thus part of the deal, was never delivered to him;
and he commenced this action to recover these shares. This
appeal is taken upon a ruling by the trial court excluding parol
evidence which was introduced by the plaintiff to show that the
water in question was appurtenant to the land.
The defendant listed his farm and home with a real
estate agency, and it was placed on the multiple listing. The
listing agreement stated that the price would be $22,000 and
that the water rights were "extra good, plenty water" (Exhibit
1-A) . Plaintiff contacted a real estate agent and was shown
the property. Upon talking with the defendant, the price was
raised to $23,500; and on March 29, 1951, an earnest money
receipt was signed calling for a sale of the property with all
water rights "appertaining" thereto (Exhibit 1-B). On April
7, 1951, the parties signed a Uniform Real Estate Contract
calling for the sale of the same property with the same water
rights, and on the same day an escrow agreement was entered
into wherein there was placed in a bank the deed to the property,
together with a number of shares of water stock. The water
stock in question was not included in the escrow (Exhibits
1-D, 1-E).
At the trial, the following evidence was introduced to
prove that the water in question was appurtenant to the land:
1. The defendant (grantor) received the water in question
at the time he received a deed to the property, and to his knowledge the water had been used on the land sirn:e 1926. He personally had used it on the land in question from the time he
obtained the property ( 1950) until he conveyed the property
to the plaintiff (R. 109, 110).

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2. The watermaster for the water companies testified that
this water had been used on this land since about 1917 (R. 68).
Fur~hermore, the watermaster gave his opinion that without
the water in question the land had only a "fair" water right,
but with this particular water it had a "good" water right (R.
71).
3. The plaintiff used the water for two years, at which
time the defendant alleged it was not part of the transaction and
the water was cut off. Without this water, there was not enough
water to adequately grow crops on the land (R. 21-23).
4. The plaintiff used the seven and one-half shares m
question and paid the assessments thereon for the years 1952
and 1953 (R. 11, 12).
5. Other water, represented by stock, which had been used
on the land passed to the plaintiff pursuant to the general language of the contract (Exhibit 1-E).
The plaintiff introduced the following evidence concerning
the intention of the parties, subject to the objection that such
introduction violated the parol evidence rule. The objection
was subsequently sustained and the evidence stricken.
1. Testimony of the plaintiff that during the discussions
prior to the signing of the contract the defendant stated that
the seven and one-half shares of Provo water in question were
to be sold with the property (R. 6, 7}.
2. A written record which the plaintiff had made at the
time of these negotiations which lists the Provo water amon,~
the water shares to be transferred (R. 7 and Exhibit 1-L).

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3. That the initial asking price for the property, whic
was $22,000, was raised to $23,500 because the defendant sai
it was worth J1,500 more with full water rights (R. 8, 9
(R. 84).
4. When the deeds and stock were placed in escrow, th
defendant said he could not find the seven and one-half shan
of Provo stock, but that he would bring them in. The repn
sentative of the bank, in front of all parties, said to the plaintifl
··you don't need to worry-it (the additional seven and om
half shares) will be brought in-he (the defendant) is an f}j
bishop" (R. 11). The real estate agent affirmed that this wa
the conversation that took place (R. 88, 89).
5. The real estate agent had made a worksheet at th
time of the transaction, showing the exact shares to be sol~
with the property as dictated by the defendant. The seven an~
one-half shares in question were listed on this workshee
(Exhibit 1-C, and R. 85, 86, 98). The real estate agent ha~
copied the number of shares to go with the transaction, includ
ing the seven and one-half shares in question, on the back o
the listing agreement during the preliminary negotiation (fu
hibit 1-A and R. 97).
6. The defendant told the listing agent there was plent
of water (R. 119).
In its minute entries, the court held that ( 1) testimon
of preliminary negotiations should be stricken because of th
parol evidence rule, and ( 2) the real estate purchase contract i
not ambiguous.
It is submitted to this court on appeal that, if the real estat
6
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contract is not ambiguous, then it is clear that the water in
question was appurtenant to the land, as was other water
represented by shares of stock which passed to the plaintiff
in tLc transaction. It is further submitted that, since the contract
purported to transfer all appurtenant water, the parol evidence
which was introduced as to the intent of the parties clearly
establishes that the water was to be transferred with the land
and that it was appurtenant. By either alternative the trial
court erred in awarding the water to the defendant.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE: THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SUSTAINS THE FACT THAT THE WATER H.J QUESTIOI,~
WAS APPURTENANT TO THE LAND CONVEYED AND
THAT IT WAS IN FACT CONVEYED WITH THE LAND.
POINT TWO: PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE
BEEN RECEIVED TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS
OF THE PARTIES AS TO APPURTENANT WATER.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SUSTAINS THE
fACT THAT THE WATER IN QUESTION WAS APPURTENANT TO THE LAND CONVEYED AND THAT IT
WAS IN FACT CONVEYED WITH THE LAND.
"It has long been the law in
rights, even though appurtenant
be separately conveyed from that
v. McFarland, et ux, Utah, 1954,

this state that water
to certain land, may
land." Salt Lake City
265 P. 2d 626.
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The legislature of this state has attempted to further
clarify this proposition with the following statute:
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real estate, except when
they are represented by shares of stock in a corporation,
in which case water shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land ... " 73-1-10, U.C.A., 1953.
This court, in the case of Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking
Co., 2 Utah 2d 93, 269 P. 2d 859, has said that the effect of this
statute:
" ... was to establish a rebuttable presumption that
a water right represented by shares of stock in a corporation did not pass to the grantee as an appurtenance
to the land upon which the water right was used, but
that the grantee could overcome such presumption if
he could show by clear and convincing evidence that
said water right was in fact appurtenant and that the
grantor intended to transfer the water right with the
land, even though no express mention of any water
right was made in the deed ...
"In other words, the 1943 amendment merely obviated the necessity for a grantor, who owned a water
right represented by shares of stock in a corporation
but who did not desire to transfer that water right to
the grantee of the land upon which the water was being
used, to make an express reservation of that water
right in the deed. But the amendment does not foreclose
the water right from passing if the grantee can show
such was the intention of the grantor . .. (Italics added.)
In the Brimm case, supra, the court found (1) The water
had been used to irrigate the land since 1890, (2) the land
had little value without the water, and ( 3) the decree of
distribution contained the words .. together with water right

8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

appurtenant thereto." Based upon these findings, the court
held that the grantee had paid the grantors for the land on the
basis that the water went with the land.
Essentially the same facts are presented in this case as in
the Brimm case. ( 1) The water has been used to irrigate the
land since about 1917 (R. 68); (2) The land is of little value
without the water (R. 21-23); and (3) The contract conveyed the land with "all water rights appurtenant thereto."
As an additional fact, the price was raised from $22,000 to
$23,500 because of the good water rights (R. 8, 9, 84). Under
these facts in this case, it should follow that the water \vas
appurtenant to the land and it was the intention of the grantor
defendant to convey these rights. In fact, this case represents
a stronger case in favor of conveyance of this water. In the
Brimm case there was no language in the contract which indicated that it was the intent of the parties to specifically convey
all the water rights appurtenant to the land. In this case the
language in the contract precisely establishes this to be the intent
of the parties.
Numerous cases support this vtew. In the case of Dill
et al v. Killip et al., Oregon, 1944, 147 P. 2d 896, the only
mention of water rights in the deed was the phrasing ''with
the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances." After the
transfer of the property, the dispute arose between the grantor
and grantee as to whether or not certain water rights had been
transferred. Quoting from Wiel's Water Rights in the Western
States} the court said:
"It is well settled that a water-right may pass with
land as an appurtenance thereto, or as a parcel thereof,
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but not necessarily so; and wbether a water right passes
as an appurtenance involves two questions, viz: (a)
Whether the water-right is an appurtenance, and (b)
whether, being such, it was intended to pass. Both of
these are questions of fact in each case.
"The first question, whether the water-right is an
appurtenance, depends on whether it is an incident,
necessary to the enjoyment of the land. The waterright is not necessarily appurtenant to or parcel of
any land; and whether it is an appurtenance or parcel
is a question of fact resting chiefly upon whether it
was used specially for the benefit of the land in question . . . A water right is incidental or appurtenant to
land when by right used with the land for its benefit."
(Italics added.)
Quoting from Bank of British North America v. Miller, C. C.,
6 F. 545, 550, the court went on to say:
"It is also clear that a sale of any real property carries
with it any easement or privilege which is necessary to
its enjoyment, and at the time is in use thereon and
therewith, as an appurtenance in fact,_ although not
technically so at law, and this upon the presumption,
more or less cogent according to the circumstances, that
it was the intention of the parties to the agreement of
sale that it should pass with the property to which it
was then apparently subservient.
"In such a case the question is simply as to the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of
the conveyance, the subject matter, and its use and
situation at the time of the sale, or as was said by Mr.
Justice Story in United States v. Appleton, rln the construction of grants the court ought to take into consideration the circumstances attendant upon the tt'ansaction, the particular situation of the parties, the state
of the country, and the state of the thing granted, for
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the pat'ties.
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In truth, every grant of a thing naturally and necessarily
imports a grant of it as it actually exists, unless the
contrary is provided for.' " (Italics added.)
In the case of James v. Barker et al., Colo., 193 7, 64 P. 2d 598,
where an almost identical situation existed, a deed purported
to convey some water rights with the usual "together with all
and singular the privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging" clause. Numerous water rights had been used on the
land. Where the dispute concerned whether or not certain
shares of water stock were part of the conveyance, the court
said:
"The evidence tends to show that the land on which
the deed of trust for $15,000 was given, if only the
water right from the Colorado Canal was included,
would be worth from $10 to $125 per acre. There was
over $24,000 due on the indebtedness at the time of
the foreclosure.
"Are these water rights, represented by the stock in
the reservoir companies, appurtenances to the land
involved in the foreclosure, and were they conveyed
by the trustee's deed? The answer is the decision of
this case. Plaintiff argues that they are not, that they
may be conveyed independently of the land; further,
that they were pledged for use only in the event of a
deficiency at sale of the land and water rights described in the deed. Defendants contend that they are
appurtenances to the land covered by the deed of trust;
that they are necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the
land; that the land did not have practical value for
agricultural purposes without them; that the value of
the land with these supplemental water rights approximated the bid at the trustee's sale, and that it may be
presumed from the circumstances existing at the time
the deed of trust was given, that all these rights were
intended to be included in the conveyance of the property.
11
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"That all of the water rights involved were at all
times used on the land does not seem to be questioned.
That they were indispensable to give to the land the
value necessary to secure the amount of the loan made
is not seriously in doubt. That they were considered to
be included in the transaction conveyance would logically induce the bid as made at the sale. That water rights
are sometimes conveyed by a deed to land that is silent
on the subject is settled law. A water right used, as
here, for the irrigation of land, will pass under the
appurtenance clause in a conveyance of land, without
a specific mention in the deed, if the presumptions
arising from the circumstances of the transaction make
it appear that it was the intention of the grantor that
it should so pass." (Italics added.)
A very recent Nevada case illustrates the jealous nature of
appurtenant water:
"The water and the land to which it is applied become so interrelated and dependent on each other in
order to constitute a valid appropriation that the former
becomes by reason of necessity appurtenant to the
latter. Such would appear to be the universally recognized laws of waters in the arid western states." Zolezzi
v. Jackson, Nevada, 1956, 297 P. 2d 1081.
This court has also emphasized the adherence of water to land:
rrshares of stock of an irrigation company issued in
place of the vested water right for lands in an irrigation
district are appurtenant unless they have been transferred and put to a beneficial use upon other lands."
Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal and Irrigation
Company, et al., Utah, 1945, 162 P. 2d 101. Ibid.

For further authorities supporting the above proposition see
Gillespie Land and Irrigation Company v. Buckeye Irrigation
Co., et al., Arizona, 1953, 257 P. 2d 393; New River Mineral
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Co. v. Painter, Virginia, 1902, 42 S. E. 300; Shire v. Kammers
State Bank, 112 Kan. 690, 213 P. 159; 70 A.L.R. 753; 93
C.J.S. page 1070.

POINT TWO
PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECEIVED TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS OF THE
PARTIES AS TO APPURTENANT WATER.
In this case the contract which the parties signed called
for the conveyance of the land "together with all buildings
and improvements thereon and all water rights appurtenant
thereto" (Exhibit 1-D). No mention was made as to the precise shares of water that were to be conveyed.
Regarding the parol evidence rule, this court has held:
"The rule is founded upon the principle that when
the parties have discussed and agreed upon their obligations to each other, and reduced those terms to writing, that such terms if clear and unambiguous, furnish
better and more definite evidence of what was undertaken by each party than the too often fickle memory
of man, for what else reduce it to writing." Garrett v.
Ellison, 93 U. 184, 72 P. 2d 449. (Italics added.)
It is the general rule that where the contract is vague,
uncertain or indefinite as to the identity of the property intended
to be conveyed, parol evidence is admissible to give effect to the
intention of the parties to the instrument. Such evidence is
not to vary or contradict the language of the writing, but it
ts to make clear that which was uncertain so far as this is
possible without aiding material terms to the writing. 68
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A.L.R. 15. See also, Joerger v. Pacific Gas and Electric, California, 1929, 276 P. 1017, Williamson v. Pratt, California,
1918, 174 P. 114, and Thompson v. McKenna, California,
1913, 133 P. 512. As has been argued in Point One, the intention
of the parties in these kinds of cases is all important. For this
reason the problem presented in this case as to whether or
not it was intended that certain shares of water stock should
be conveyed with the land where the usual "all water rights
appurtenant thereto" clause has been used, clearly illustrates
this exception to the parol evidence rule.
In the case of Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., supra,
this court held that the Utah statute regarding the passing of
shares of water stock with the land (73-1-10) "was to establi.:..h a rebuttable presumption that a water right represented
by shares of stock in a corporation did not pass to the grantee
as an appurtenance ... but the grantee could overcome such
presumption if he could show by clear and convincing evidence
that said water right was in fact appurtenant and that the
grantor intended to transfer the water right with the land."
There is no way that this plaintiff could rebut this presumption
without introducing parol evidence to establish the intent of
the parties. The trial court was in error when it refused to
allow such evidence.
In the case of Dill, et al., v. Killip, et al., Ore. 1944, 147
P. 2d 896, where precisely the same problem was presented,
the court emphasized the importance of the intent of the
parties with the following language:
"In such a case tbe question is simply as to the intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the
conveyance, the subject matter, and its use and situation
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at the time of the sale, or as was said by Mr. Justice
Story in United States v. Appleton, 'In the construction
of grants the court ought to take into consideration the
circumstances attendant upon the transaction, the particular situation of the parties, the state of the country,
and the state of the thing granted, for the purpose of
ascertaining the intention of the parties." (Italics
added.)

In an action based on a contract which was indefinite, the
Arizona court said:
"The court had the right to receive the evidence
concerning the conditions existing at the time the contract was executed and the oral evidence showing the
intention of the parties . ... The terms of the contract
are thus rendered sufficiently definite ... " Colmenero
Canal Co. v. Babers, Arizona 1956, 297 P. 2d 927.
(Italics added.)
In Brown v. Warren, 1881, 16 Nevada 228, where a general
description of "all the real estate, water rights, and property
of every description, real and personal, in the State of Nevada
belonging to the parties of the first" was used in a conveyance, parol evidence was held admissible to enable an identification of the property even though the deed was not ambiguous.
The Colorado court has affirmed this view in the following language:
"A water right used, as here, for the irrigation of
land, will pass under the appurtenance clause in a
conveyance of land, without a specific mention in the
deed, if the presumption arising from the circumstances
of the transaction make it appear that it was the intention of the grantor that it should so pass." James v.
Barker, 99 Colo. 551, 64 P. 2d 598. (Italics added.)
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This court has outlined the parol evidence question in the
following manner:

. "If the ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence
should not be allowed. If the instrument or its fact
remains ambiguous in spite of the reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all
written instruments which were a part of the same
transaction. If the intent is ambiguous still, then parol
evidence may be admitted, and rules of construction
may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties."
Continental Bank v. Bybee, 1957, 306 P. 2d 773.
It was necessary to introduce parol evidence to establish
just what the defendant intended to convey (R. 116). From
the cases already cited, it seems that the word "appurtenant"
1s not ambiguous; however, the defendant himself used parol

evidence to attempt to show his intention (R. 102, 107, 116).
If it is believed that parol evidence is necessary in this case,
it is submitted that the weight of the evidence as to the intention
of the parties clearly establishes that the seven and one-half
shares of water in question were to be conveyed with the
property.

CONCLUSION
The parol evidence and an abundance of other evidence
which was presented in this case clearly indicates that the water
in question was appurtenant to the land conveyed and that
it was the intention of the parties to convey this water. The
courts have universally recognized the uselessness of farm
land without water, and for this reason it is virtually a pre-
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sumption that once water is appurtenant to the land and the
land is conveyed with all its appurtenances, the water is conveyed also. These are precisely the facts of this case. In the face
of such explicit protection of water rights, the defendant
has not satisfied his burden of proving the water was not transferred with the land. Even where parol evidence is introduced
by both sides, the facts are conclusively in favor of the plaintiff.
The Brimm case being controlling under the facts of this
case, the plaintiff should have been permitted to rebut the
presumption created by the statute. The trial court, having
erroneously excluded such extrinsic evidence, was not in a
position to make a finding that the water was not appurtenant.
Rather, the evidence so excluded clearly indicates that it was
appurtenant to the land and that, in fact, it was the intent
of the parties that it should be conveyed to the plaintiff.
For these reasons the holding of the trial court should
be reversed, with instructions to assess the damages suffered
by the plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,
RALPH & BUSHNELL

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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